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THE SOUND OF ONE FORM BATILING 
Comments on Daniel Keating's 
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action' 
Richard Craswell* 
Daniel Keating has provided a thoughtful and useful study of the 
way that businesses form contracts.1 In particular, he has given us a 
good deal of data concerning the problem known as the "battle of the 
forms." Commercial lawyers have, of course, been wrangling over this 
problem for decades, so it is no small accomplishment to be able to of­
fer a useful contribution. 
In Part I below, I describe more precisely just what Keating's data 
does and does not illuminate. Parts II and III then focus on a particu­
lar contracting practice that Keating has identified: the practice of 
getting both parties to sign a "master agreement" in advance of a se­
ries of deals. These master agreements let the parties agree in ad­
vance to the terms that will govern their subsequent deals, without 
leaving those terms to depend on the invoices and other forms that 
will subsequently be exchanged. This encapsulation of the parties' 
agreement in a single document could be said to eliminate the battle 
entirely, for it certainly solves many of the technical problems that 
plague commercial lawyers whenever the parties' documents fail to 
match. I argue, though, that these master agreements may not solve 
all of the objections that some courts and some scholars have raised in 
"battle of the forms" cases. While I believe these objections are mis­
guided, they may nevertheless be influential, so there is at least a ques­
tion about how often these master agreements will be upheld by 
courts. 
I. THE BEHAVIOR BEHIND THE CONTRACTING BEHAVIOR 
At the outset, it is worth clarifying what Keating's study does and 
does not address. His study tells us a good deal about contracting be­
havior: about how businesses draft standard forms, negotiate with one 
another, and so on. However, his study does not attempt to examine 
the underlying economic behavior those contracts govern - that is, 
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.A 1974, Michigan State; J.D. 1977, Univer­
sity of Chicago. -Ed. 
1. Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 
(2000). 
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Keating does not study the production, pricing, or sale of actual goods. 
As a result, his study does not address the issues that are most central 
to the normative literature on the battle of the forms. 
For example, one issue raised by that normative literature is 
whether it should be easier or harder for sellers to displace the 
U.C.C.'s standard default rules. Unless the parties agree otherwise, 
the U.C.C. makes sellers liable for all consequential damages caused 
by any defect that leaves a product less than "merchantable,"2 and this 
rule is sometimes criticized as inefficient. 3 If this criticism is correct -
an issue to which I return below - then it might be desirable to give 
sellers an easy way to contract around those default rules, perhaps by 
specifying some other remedy in their standard form. Other scholars, 
however, argue that sellers' forms may be inefficient in the opposite 
direction, by being overly stingy toward buyers (for example, by dis­
claiming any warranty entirely).4 If this criticism is correct, we might 
be better off with a battle-of-the-forms rule that made it harder for 
sellers to contract around the U.C.C.'s default remedies. 
My only point here is that a study such as Professor Keating's can­
not resolve the question of whether the U.C.C.'s default remedies are 
either more or less efficient than those that appear in sellers' (or buy­
ers') standard forms. This is because the efficiency of any remedial 
provision - either a default remedy in the U.C.C., or a remedy stipu­
lated in a standard form - depends on the underlying economic be­
havior that will be governed by the contract. For example, a clause 
disclaiming all warranties might indeed be inefficient (all else being 
equal) if the resulting freedom from liability reduced sellers' incen­
tives to produce merchantable products, leading to inefficiently low 
levels of product quality. To test this hypothesis, though, we would 
need to measure actual product quality to see whether sellers whose 
forms disclaimed warranty liability tended to produce lower-quality 
products than those whose forms did not. In other words, the under­
lying economic beh_avior - in this case, the level of quality produced 
by sellers - is what must be studied to resolve this normative debate. 
The same is true of the contrary claim, that the U.C.C.'s default 
remedies are inefficient because they are overly generous to buyers. 
For example, the default remedy of full liability for all consequential 
damages might be inefficient if it unduly reduced buyers' incentives to 
take their own steps to reduce those consequential damages. This de-
2. u.c.c. §§ 2-314, 2-715(2). 
3. E.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the 
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1250-51 (1982); Victor P. Goldberg, 
The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV.155, 
157 (1997). 
4. E.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1173 (1983). I discuss this criticism infra at notes 14-19. 
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fault remedy might also be inefficient if it led to cross-subsidization of 
some buyers by others5 -for example, if small buyers who were un­
likely to suffer large consequential damages were charged the same 
price as larger buyers whose consequential losses were likely to be 
more severe. To tests these hypotheses, though, we would again have 
to study the underlying economic behavior of buyers and sellers. To 
evaluate the first effect, we would have to study the actual precautions 
taken by buyers to minimize their consequential damages in the event 
of a breach. To evaluate the second, we would have to study the ac­
tual prices set by sellers who were subject to liability for full conse­
quential damages. In particular, we would have to study the extent to 
which those prices did or did not vary with the consequential damages 
likely to be suffered by any particular buyer. 
Obviously, Professor Keating's study does not attempt to shed 
light on this underlying business behavior. Keating interviewed law­
yers to learn how businesses draft standard forms, and how they re­
spond to forms offered by others. He did not interview engineers to 
learn how businesses make product quality decisions, or accountants 
and sales managers to learn how businesses set prices. This is what I 
mean when I say that Keating's study tells us much about contracting 
behavior, but little about the underlying economic behavior those con­
tracts might affect. 
I should add at once that this observation is not a criticism of Pro­
fessor Keating. Keating's method of interviewing business people is a 
useful way of gaining insights into how contracts are formed, but I 
doubt that it would have been nearly so useful as a way of assessing 
underlying price and quality behavior. There are, after all, any num­
ber of factors that influence the price that a business charges; and a 
sales manager who is asked about her pricing decision is unlikely even 
to mention U.C.C. section 2-207 as one of the factors in her decision. 
She is more likely to respond only in general terms -for example, 
"We charge enough to cover our costs," or "We charge whatever the 
market will bear." Interviews of product quality engineers likely will 
produce similarly general answers - for example, "We produce the 
most durable product that we can;" or, if pressed, "Yes, we could 
make our product even more durable, but our customers wouldn't pay 
that much." 
To be sure, these general responses are still consistent with the 
possibility that the legal rule does have some effect on price and qual­
ity decisions. After all, if the legal rule affects all sellers' costs (or all 
buyers' behavior), it thereby would influence the equilibrium in the 
market as a whole, thus helping determine what prices customers were 
in fact willing to pay, or what prices the market would bear. But these 
5. See Gwyn D. Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1125 (1988). 
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effects of the legal rule will be remote and indirect (assuming they ex­
ist at all): they will be an invisible part of the background environ­
ment that sales managers and product engineers take as given. As a 
result, interviews of the sort that Keating conducted are likely to be of 
little use in assessing the law's indirect effects. 
I can only add, regrettably, that it is also difficult to study these in­
direct effects even through more formal, statistical methods. In prin­
ciple, one could measure the prices and product quality chosen by 
various sellers under various remedial regimes - while also collecting 
data on all of the other factors that affect sellers' choices of price and 
quality - and then analyze the statistics to try to isolate the effect of 
different remedial rules. But data are extremely difficult to gather 
even on the main variables of concern - price and quality. It is even 
more difficult to get data on all of the other factors that would have to 
be controlled for (for example, changes in raw material costs and 
changes in customer demand) to isolate statistically the effects of any 
change in the remedial rule. Thus, while it would be wonderful to 
have such studies (and efforts in that direction should be championed 
wholeheartedly), this is not an avenue of research that is likely to give 
us answers any time soon. 
Still, the unattainable best should not be the enemy of the merely 
good. That is, even though we lack studies that would give us the an­
swers we ultimately need, interviews like Professor Keating's can still 
tell us a good deal about various prior or intermediate questions. I 
tum now to one such implication of Keating's study, which seems to 
me to deserve further comment. 
II. CONTRACTING AROUND THE RULES FOR 
CONTRACTING AROUND 
I refer here to the practice of firms that require their suppliers or 
customers to sign a "master agreement" in which they specify an en­
tire set of rules to govern subsequent dealings between the parties.6 In 
effect, these firms have abandoned the effort to draft forms that, if ex­
changed in connection with each individual contract, would survive the 
application of section 2-207 and give the seller (or the buyer) the 
terms it wanted. Instead, these firms have opted out of section 2-207 
entirely by providing a different set of rules - the rules in the "master 
agreement" - by which the terms of each subsequent contract will be 
determined. 
This practice is of interest for several reasons. To begin with, most 
of the prior literature on section 2-207 assumed (quite plausibly) that 
the fundamental problem was one of high transaction costs. At least 
6. See Keating, supra note 1, at 2696. Keating refers to these agreements as "practices 
that eliminate the battle." 
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for businesses with large numbers of purchases or sales, it simply is not 
worth the time it would take to hammer out an explicit agreement 
about every possible contingency that might arise in every single con­
tract. Indeed, for most such businesses it probably is not worth any­
one's time to actually read every provision in every document. As 
Victor Goldberg has put it, "[m]aintaining lawyers on the loading dock 
is not cheap."7 
What Keating's interviews tell us, though, is that the transaction 
costs required to read and understand a contract do not necessarily 
have to be incurred again and again for every single contract. Instead, 
if a buyer and seller expect to deal repeatedly, they can agree once on 
a master contract which itself supplies the terms for each subsequent 
"contract" they might enter into. Because this master contract need 
only be read and negotiated once, the cost of reading and negotiating 
can be spread over a number of subsequent transactions. In effect, the 
cost per transaction has been reduced. Put slightly differently, even 
firms that do not find it worthwhile to read and negotiate the terms of 
each individual shipment (the "lawyers on the loading dock" scenario) 
might still find it worthwhile to read and negotiate the terms of an en­
tire, long-lasting relationship. 
To be sure, the mere fact that these master agreements are avail­
able does not, by itself, establish that they deserve legal enforcement. 
I will address that issue below in Part III. For now, my only point is 
that one of the assumptions underlying the previous literature on the 
battle-of-the-forms - to wit, that it generally is infeasible for firms to 
read and negotiate explicit provisions governing all their dealings - is 
now demonstrably untrue, at least for some contracting parties. Even 
if this were all that Keating's study demonstrated (and it is not), that 
fact alone would be a significant contribution. 
More generally, the "master agreements" phenomenon also shows 
that there are different ways to contract around a default rule. When 
we speak of "contracting around a default rule," we usually imagine 
firms agreeing to alter some particular rule - a default remedial pro­
vision, for example, or an implied warranty. Firms that sign master 
agreements certainly do this, if the terms of the master agreement dif­
fer from the otherwise applicable default rules. Less obviously, how­
ever, the master agreements also alter the default rules that would 
otherwise govern the contract formation process itself, including the 
rule found in U.C.C. section 2-207. That is, firms that sign master 
agreements thereby agree that the terms of future dealings will not be 
those that are found in any subsequent expression of acceptance (as 
would otherwise be the case under section 2-207(1)), plus any addi­
tional terms that would otherwise qualify under section 2-207(2). In-
7. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 164. 
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stead, these firms purport to be agreeing that the terms of future 
dealings will be the terms spelled out in the master agreement itself, 
without regard to any subsequent invoices or confirmations that might 
be exchanged. In effect, then, these firms are opting out of the forma­
tion regime represented by the current section 2-207 at the same time 
that they opt out of particular substantive default rules. 
This point may be made slightly differently by noting that it is now 
customary to divide contract law into mandatory rules and default 
rules, with the latter being those that firms are allowed to change by 
private agreement.8 This classification, however, is incomplete, for the 
possibility of displacing default rules by private agreement means that 
contract law must also contain a set of enabling rules, or rules that 
specify how such agreements can be made.9 Indeed, the current sec­
tion 2-207 is one such enabling rule, for it specifies what the parties 
must usually do to succeed (or to fail to succeed) in displacing an oth­
erwise applicable default rule. What Keating's study shows, however, 
is that firms have treated section 2-207 as being itself merely a default 
rule - a "default enabling procedure," if one wishes to be precise -
which is therefore subject to alteration by prior agreement of the par­
ties. (Again, Part III will take up the question of whether such prior 
agreements will succeed in their aim, or whether courts will instead re­
sist such attempts.) 
Viewed in these terms, the master agreements might be analogized 
more appropriately to arbitration clauses, or other choice-of-law pro­
visions, by which parties do not merely displace particular default 
rules but specify an entire regime of applicable rules. They might also 
be analogized to trade associations of the sort studied by Lisa 
Bernstein,10 in which members agree (either explicitly or implicitly) to 
be bound by the rules of the association. To be sure, trade association 
rules and choice-of-law provisions may displace existing law more 
comprehensively than do the master agreements found by Keating, 
which typically change only the formation rules (including section 2-
207) plus the particular substantive rules the parties happen to ad­
dress. Another difference is that trade association rules usually evolve 
8. For a discussion of this distinction (and its place in the contracts literature), see Ian 
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 87-93 (1989). 
9. I have elsewhere referred to these as "agreement rules." Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 503 (1989). For 
economic analyses of other rules governing contract formation, see, for example, Richard 
Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996). 
10. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001); Lisa 
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent 
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992). 
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over long periods of time, as a result of politicking and negotiation 
among a sizeable membership, while the master agreements identified 
by Keating are more likely to have been drafted recently by a single 
firm. (This difference may be relevant to courts' willingness to uphold 
such agreements, as I discuss below in Part III.) 
My point, for now, is simply that firms seem to be increasingly in­
terested in opting out of default rules on a wholesale basis - that is, 
by contracting around large sets of default rules at once, rather than 
contracting around one rule at a time (or one transaction at a time), as 
is implicitly assumed by much of the default rules literature. This is a 
contracting phenomenon, so it is quite suitable for study by Keating's 
chosen method (i.e., by interviewing corporate counsel), and he has 
provided a valuable service by calling it to our attention. 
III. WINNING THE BATILE AND LOSING THEW AR? 
While this new method of altering default rules raises a number of 
interesting questions, the most obvious question is whether the 
method is likely to be successful. After all, courts often resist attempts 
to alter individual default rules, either by interpreting the contractual 
language in a way that negates the attempt, or by throwing out the 
language as unconscionable.11 Historically, courts have sometimes 
been even more resistant to terms that specify entire alternative sys­
tems of law, such as arbitration clauses.12 
The answer to this question may depend, in part, on just how one 
conceives of the "problem" to which the battle-of-the-forms rule is the 
answer. According to one view, it is merely a technical problem of of­
fer and acceptance, which arises when (and only when) there is no sin­
gle document that both parties have assented to. In such a case, a 
battle-of-the-forms rule is needed to determine which document will 
be enforced as the parties' contract. But if the parties have, instead, 
signed the same master agreement, this technical problem disappears, 
for the court can simply enforce the terms of the master agreement. 
In short, if both parties have signed the same form, it is impossible (on 
this view) for there to be any battle. 
11. For a discussion of the argument that judicial interpretation makes it harder for par­
ties to alter default rules, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded 
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 261, 290-92 (1985); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpreta­
tion and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 {1997). For a discussion of the similar 
effects produced by the unconscionability doctrine, see Richard Craswell, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. an. L. REV. 1, 32-34 
{1993), and the other articles cited there. 
12 See, e.g., W.H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 214 P. 38 (Cal. 1923) (refusing to enforce 
arbitration clause as contrary to public policy). 
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There is, however, another view of the "battle of the forms" that 
focuses on a qifferent sort of battle: one that is present even when 
both parties have signed the same form. On this view, the problem 
posed by battle-of-the-forms cases is merely one version of the more 
general problem presented by all standard forms, which is that such 
forms often are imposed by the stronger party on the weaker without 
any real agreement. This is the view that sees "contracts of adhesion" 
as inherently suspicious, leading to the conclusion that courts should 
scrutinize all such contracts and withhold enforcement from any terms 
deemed unfair.13 On this view, then, the absence of any apparent "bat­
tle" may mean that the stronger party already has won a decisive vic­
tory, and thus has been able to dictate the terms of surrender.14 If 
courts incline to this view, master agreements of the sort described by 
Keating will not be upheld except when they are seen as having been 
freely consented to by both sides, rather than having been imposed by 
a stronger party on a weaker one. 
Of course, this second view has engendered a good deal of criti­
cism in legal scholarship, especially from an economic perspective.15 It 
is notoriously difficult to define what should count as "free consent," 
especially in any way that does not render all contracts invalid, and 
thus require judicial scrutiny of every term in every contract.16 Indeed, 
from an economic perspective the relevant question is not whether 
consent was truly "free" (however that term might be defined), but 
whether judicial scrutiny of contract terms will produce better or 
worse results than simply enforcing such contracts as written, thereby 
leaving the terms to depend on whatever constraints market forces 
13. For an early expression of this viewpoint, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe­
sion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). More 
recent examples include John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Con­
trol of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); and Rakoff, supra note 4. 
14. Significantly, many scholars who favor a strong doctrine of unconscionability to po­
lice "contracts of adhesion" also endorse the use of § 2-207 to set aside terms in buyers' or 
sellers' standard forms in favor of the U.C.C.'s normal default rules. E.g., John E. Murray, 
Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Uncon­
scionability, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 597 (1978); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Con­
tract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 57-
60 (1984). 
15. For early criticisms, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A 
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in 
Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Ine­
quality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscion­
ability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1977). Similar concerns are noted in Douglas G. Baird, Com­
mercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con: Comments on Daniel Keating's 'Exploring 
the Battle of the Forms', 98 MICH. L. REV. 2716 (2000). 
16. Relatively few advocates of the second view have been willing to suggest that virtu­
ally all contracts should be subject to this sort of judicial scrutiny. A possible exception is 
Rakoff, supra note 4. 
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may or may not provide.17 In other words, economists would want to 
ask questions like: How well are market forces working in the market 
in question? Are buyers reasonably well-informed, so that any seller 
that offers unfavorable terms is likely to suffer a loss in business? Or 
are buyers almost completely oblivious to the contract terms, so a 
seller could profit by using a one-sided term even if the term were not 
in fact efficient? Economists would also ask analogous questions 
about judicial review of contract terms: How good are courts at de­
ciding which terms are indeed in buyers' interests? Will courts prop­
erly assess the extent to which striking down a term might lead sellers 
to raise prices, or to respond in other ways that might leave buyers 
worse off? Or will courts be unable to understand such issues, and 
end up making matters worse than if the courts had not even tried to 
evaluate contract terms, and had instead simply enforced the contracts 
as written?18 
Nevertheless, in spite of two decades of economic skepticism, 
courts often continue to write as though standard forms (or "contracts 
of adhesion") were proper objects of suspicion.19 Indeed, Professor 
Keating's own discussion provides some support for this view. In de­
scribing the master agreements that he found, Keating says that they 
are used most often by "some of the larger companies,"20 who are later 
described as adopting "a more or less take-it-or-leave-it approach to 
their forms," and as "ha[ving] the leverage to insist on the other side 
signing its form."21 To be sure, these descriptions may be mere tau­
tologies: in a sense, any party who succeeds in getting its own terms 
must necessarily have had "leverage" sufficient to "insist" that the 
other party agree. But the connotation of these descriptions does not 
suggest the kind of voluntary assent that sometimes is seen as essential 
17. I discuss this question at more length in Craswell, supra note 11, and in Richard 
Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence, 
33 OSGOODE HALL J. 209 {1995). 
18. As Arthur Leff once put it, the regulation of contract terms can have: 
important economic (and therefore social) costs. If carried forward with vigor, no lawful 
contract could descend in 'fairness' or 'safety' below a certain qualitative minimum. In cer­
tain situations that would have the same effect as some building codes: the cheapest one can 
get is more expensive than one can afford. 
Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 155 {1970). 
19. For example, courts continue to cite the language of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (NJ. 1960): 
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought together 
by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of approximate economic 
equality. . . • But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract has ap­
peared. It is used primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. 
See, e. g. , Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 704 {N.J. 1992); 
Multi-Family Management, Inc. v. Hancock, 664 A.2d 1210, 1227 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
20. Keating, supra note 1, at 2697. 
21. Id. at 2702. 
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to freedom of contract by judges (or scholars) who lean toward the 
second view described above. 
Interestingly, one recent proposal to revise section 2-207 embraced 
elements of both of the views I have just described. In this proposal, 
section 2-207 (a) (2) provided that the contract consists of, among other 
things, "terms ... to which both parties have agreed."22 This language 
would seem to validate terms in a master agreement that has been 
signed by both parties.23 Of course, such terms could still be chal­
lenged under the general provision on unconscionability, but, in that 
respect, the proposed revision is no different from the current version 
of section 2-207. 
At the same time, though, the proposed section 2-207 (b) (l) added 
new language that would have permitted the enforcement even of 
terms to which the buyer "'has not otherwise agreed," as long as the 
buyer did not object within twenty or thirty days after he received the 
contract, and as long as the terms, "taken as a whole ... do not mate­
rially alter the contract to the detriment of the buyer."24 This proposal 
thus embraced the belief that some contract terms have not, in any 
meaningful sense, been "otherwise agreed to " by the buyer. However, 
the proposal provided that those terms could still be enforced, as long 
as they did not inflict a material detriment on buyers.25 Obviously, 
under this language, it was the courts who would have to decide which 
terms, in fact, worked to buyers' detriment (when the terms were 
"taken as a whole "), and when that detriment was sufficiently large to 
be "material." Thus, _this aspect of the proposed revision also re­
flected at least some degree of faith in the ability of judges to deter­
mine which terms are in buyers' interests and which terms are not. In 
that respect, the proposal was very consistent with the second view 
outlined above. 
There are, of course, further questions that would have had to be 
answered to fully assess the impact of the proposed revision. For ex­
ample, when courts evaluated such terms "taken as a whole," would 
they also have evaluated any price increases (or changes in other 
terms) that sellers might adopt if the challenged terms were invali-
22. E-mail from James J. White to Richard Craswell (February 14, 2000) (on file with 
author). This proposal was subsequently modified, see infra note 24, but I discuss it here in 
its original form because that form so nicely illustrates the two contending views. 
23. I set aside here the possibility that the language of subsequent invoice forms might 
be interpreted as proposals to modify the original master agreement. 
24. See e-mail from James J. White, supra note 22. This part of the proposed revision 
failed to gain sufficient support, and was subsequently dropped (as was the corresponding 
proposed comment, quoted infra note 25). 
25. The proposed Comment to this revision stated that this language was intended to 
strike a balance "between the buyer's need for protection from unexpected and unfair terms 
with the buyer does not see until the product is delivered and the seller's need for an inex­
pensive way of contracting with its buyers." Id. 
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dated? And, however that question is answered, how would the re­
sulting evaluation differ (if at all) from that which the court would 
conduct if the same term were challenged under the general doctrine 
of unconscionability? After all, any term that might be challenged 
under the revised section 2-207(b) potentially would have been vul­
nerable under unconscionability as well, for whenever the buyer has 
"not otherwise agreed" to a term in the seller's standard form, the lack 
of a real agreement might well count as a kind of procedural uncon­
scionability. If so, most courts would then proceed to assess the sub­
stantive unconscionability of the challenged term, by examining 
(among other things) the actual effects of the clause on buyers.26 Such 
an inquiry sounds very similar - and might even be identical - to the 
proposed section 2-207(b )(3)'s instruction that courts assess the extent 
to which a clause works "materially" to a buyer's detriment. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
In short, many discussions of the battle of the forms (and many 
proposals about how to fix the problem) reflect a fundamental am­
bivalence between two contesting views. On one view, the battle of 
the forms is a mere technical problem, which merely requires courts to 
decide what to do when different documents do not quite match. On 
another view, the battle of the forms poses a more fundamental prob­
lem about unequal bargaining power. This second problem - like 
that posed by the more general doctrine of unconscionability - re­
quires courts to decide the deeper question of what to do when the 
terms of contracts have not all been freely consented to (under some 
appropriate definition of "freely"). 
Obviously, data such as Professor Keating's cannot, by itself, help 
analysts choose between these two contesting views of the problem. 
Keating's data can, however, provide a more realistic picture of the 
contracting practices that are being analyzed, and in that capacity it 
provides a useful service to analysts in either camp. While disagree­
ments between the two camps will doubtless continue, they should 
continue on a more informed basis. 
26. The distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability was first 
noted in Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). For an economic analysis of this distinction, see Craswell, 
supra note 11, at 17-20. 
